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Almost every aspect of the partial defence of provocation has caused considerable debate over the years. Areas of difficulty range from the question of when the issue should be left to the jury, to the relevance of the defence to battered women who kill. The issue for consideration here will be the 'reasonable' or 'ordinary man' and the characteristics imputed to him in the light of the accused's own character. R. v. Smith 1 reaffirms the Court of Appeal's view that the accused's characteristics should be included at all levels of the test. Attitudes to this differ considerably. On the one hand, some argue that the doctrine weakens the legal requirement of self-control and is therefore only acceptable where the accused has been pushed to extremes. This is ensured by maintaining a highly objective approach and narrow interpretation of the 'reasonable man'. On the other hand, it is argued that, in the interests of attaining justice, characteristics of the accused should be imputed to the reasonable man in order to acknowledge that some people will find conduct more provoking than others, and that some individuals may have a lower threshold of selfrestraint which should be taken into account. This article considers the merits of these two approaches by analysing recent English case law and contrasting this with Australian developments.
The author wishes to thank Douglas W. Vick, University of Stirling, for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article. 1 [1998] 4 All ER 387.
English Law
The reasonable man did not emerge here until the late nineteenth century, and for almost a hundred years judges directed juries on the characteristics attributable to him. The approach was to look at the provocative effect of the conduct on the law looks at such characteristics for two purposes. The first is to accurately assess the gravity of the provocation. Here, the subjective characteristics of the accused will be given to the reasonable man so that they can be taken into account in determining the seriousness of the provocative conduct. Secondly, the accused must be shown to have exercised an appropriate level of self-control and for this test, those individual peculiarities are ignored, leading to an objective assessment. In Luc Thiet Thuan, the accused was suffering from brain damage which impaired control of his impulses.
The Court of Appeal felt that such individual characteristics were not relevant to the reasonable person unless the provocation was directed at that characteristic (his mental abnormality). This reasoning was also upheld by the majority in the Privy Council, which result may well have been influenced by the mix of judges from different jurisdictions who heard the case, as some of them came from systems which adopt a fairly narrow approach to the level of self-control required.. It was felt that the appropriate plea was diminished responsibility, as a mental abnormality was not a relevant characteristic for the objective limb of the test. Thus the test for this aspect of provocation seemed at this stage to have moved from a highly objective, narrow formulation, to a two-fold test, the first part of which injects an element of subjectivity whilst the second retains a suitable degree of objectivity.
However, a recent English case casts some doubt on the exclusion of individual characteristics from the second limb. In R. v. Smith 9 the question was whether the accused's severe depression was a relevant characteristic to impute to the reasonable man. It was held that it was relevant to an assessment of the gravity of the In summary, English law now requires that the reasonable man should have all the mental and physical characteristics of the accused in relation to the gravity of the provocation. Furthermore, all such characteristics are relevant to the level of selfcontrol required, with the time-honoured exception of irascibility. The latter substantially weakens the self-control element and thereby the objectivity of the partial defence of provocation. Critics would say that this allows the accused to escape conviction for murder all the more easily since, having measured the gravity of the provocation through his eyes, the self-control required of him would only be that of the reasonable man who had all the accused's peculiar characteristics except irascibility.
14 supra, p2. 15 [1992] give them meaning. To assess the gravity of the conduct, any list given of relevant characteristics was not felt to be exhaustive as any circumstance which explained the accused's conduct should be taken into account.
McHugh J.'s judgement points to the strange juxtaposition whereby all relevant characteristics are included for the first part of the test, but substantially excluded for the second. He states that the 'ordinary person' test would be meaningless if all characteristics were included in this second limb as well as in the first, since the idea of an objective test is to provide one standard which everyone has to meet 22 . Whilst he accepted the need to include personal characteristics in the assessment of the gravity of provocation, he refused to include these characteristics in the second limb relating to the required level of self-control, as to do so would be to undermine the objectivity of the test completely. McHugh felt that the objective standard was too well-entrenched in the common law for a judge to be able to remove it. However, he did go on to say that some characteristics could be included in the objective 'ordinary person' test without compromising that objectivity, instancing ethnicity and cultural background, and age. 
The future of the reasonable man test
It seems sensible to identify two separate aspects to the rule that the provocation must be such as would make the reasonable man lose self-control. The first step in any decision must be to measure the level or gravity of that provocation.
It further seems sensible to assess the gravity subjectively. The overall tenor of the test is objective -the law requires a certain degree of self-control from everyone -but this should not be followed too slavishly so as to exclude all subjective assessments.
To measure the seriousness of the provoking conduct requires acknowledgement of characteristics peculiar to the accused, as these will have an effect on the measure of that provocation. If the accused has certain characteristics which render the conduct more provoking than would be expected, there seems little point in artificially ignoring this. It is better to acknowledge it, measure the level of provocation accordingly, and then ask whether, objectively, the reasonable man faced with that increased level of provocation would have responded in the same manner as the accused. This approach acknowledges the reality of the accused's situation (that he 22 ibid., p9.
felt the sting of the provocation more keenly) but still requires him to respond to that in a way deemed to be socially acceptable (in a way which mirrors the reasonable man's response). Admittedly, the accused is not required to meet an unmodified form of the reasonable man test, since some of his characteristics are imputed when assessing the acceptable level of response, but these are, broadly speaking, limited to age and sex, with the addition of culture and ethnicity in Australia. It is widely accepted that factors such as age are not peculiar to the accused and should be relevant to the level of self-control required of him. However, if the test is to remain fairly objective, cultural and ethnic factors should perhaps be acknowledged as relatively indeterminate and therefore unsuitable for inclusion. Although they are not peculiar to the individual, they are also not, unlike being of a particular age and gender, universal.
Whatever the status of these cultural and ethnic factors, it seems clear that all characteristics of the accused should not be included when assessing whether the reasonable man would have responded in such a way to a given level of provocation.
While all relevant characteristics should be taken into account to determine the gravity of the provocation, to allow them in the second limb of the test removes any real requirement of self-control. The accused would simply show that he had reacted immediately to conduct which he saw as extremely provoking for some personal ethnic factors in that jurisdiction seems perhaps unwarranted if the aim is to retain objectivity, but this appears to reflect their particular situation and political concern to acknowledge their level of multi-culturalism.
However, England appears to have taken a step too far in R. v. Smith where they impute all the accused's personal characteristics, except irascibility, to the reasonable man for both limbs of the test. It is worth noting, however, that the Court of Appeal granted leave for the case to proceed to the House of Lords, and it will be
interesting to see what line they take. It is submitted that objectivity should be preserved in this limb of the test, along the lines used previously in England, and consistently in Australia. The dual test allows subjective factors to determine the gravity of the provocation, but still insists that certain standards of self-control are met, with very limited concessions to universal characteristics which affect ability to achieve such a standard. Any extension to this test subjectivises the concept of the reasonable man too much.
